![]() But we do this because we are taking a precautionary approach like her we feel that fish should be treated as if sentient –despite not yet being convinced there is strong evidence that fish definitely are sentient. To put this in the context of our own views, personally and professionally we treat fish as though sentient (e.g., we are working on a zebrafish enrichment and welfare project in which Victoria was involved). But we also laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating welfare protections for fish, and seek to show how the high current levels of agnosticism about fish sentience are consistent with adopting practical guidelines that aim to protect fish. So, as authors of yet another “fish sentience” review, what can we add that will constructively promote her legacy? Our aim is to celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those remaining unconvinced that fish are sentient, and to leverage the high levels of evidence they require into a research agenda for the future. Trying to identify what would make for stronger evidence of sentience was therefore one of Victoria's last pieces of scholarly work ( 15). And this reflects a much broader, harder problem: that the functions of consciousness are still not understood. Yet most seem uncertain: 83% of the 43 responses to Key ( 14) in Animal Sentience, for example, do not take a firm stance on whether or not fish can feel pain. comm), while at the other extreme some argue that they feel not only pain but also fear ( 12) and even maybe joy ( 13). ![]() Views can be polarized: at one extreme some argue that fish have no awareness of anything at all, including pain (Key in prep., pers. But the question of whether fish are aware of noxious stimuli, and feel true pain, remains contested and controversial, stimulating considerable debate. Victoria Braithwaite celebrated in this Special Topic collection, there is no disputing what an important issue this is, and also no argument as to whether bony fishes possess functioning nociceptors. Today, thanks in part to the trailblazing work of Dr. In other words, the central issue is: when fish react to actual or threatened tissue damage, does this indicate true pain, with its “phenomenal” character ? Or just mere nociception: an unconscious process by which noxious stimuli are responded to?. ![]() Overall, we celebrate the rigorous evidential standards required by those unconvinced that fish are sentient laud the compassion and ethical rigor shown by those advocating for welfare protections and seek to show how precautionary principles still support protecting fish from physical harm.ĭebates around fishes' ability to feel pain are essentially debates about consciousness. To end, we address how to balance such doubts with welfare protection, discussing concerns raised by key skeptics in this debate. Because “bullet-proof” neurological and behavioral indicators of sentience are thus still lacking, agnosticism about fish sentience remains widespread. We suggest new experiments on humans to test these hypotheses, as well as modifications to tests for “mental time travel” and self-awareness (e.g., mirror self-recognition) that could allow these to now probe sentience (since currently they reflect perceptual rather than evaluative, affective aspects of consciousness). Potentially more valid are aspects of working memory, operant conditioning, the self-report of state, and forms of higher order cognition. Consequently, none of these responses are good indicators of sentience. subjects” can show approach/withdrawal react with apparent emotion change their reactivity with food deprivation or analgesia discriminate between stimuli display Pavlovian learning, including some forms of trace conditioning and even learn simple instrumental responses. After reviewing key consciousness concepts, we identify “red herring” measures that should not be used to infer sentience because also present in non-sentient organisms, notably those lacking nervous systems, like plants and protozoa (P) spines disconnected from brains (S) decerebrate mammals and birds (D) and humans in unaware states (U). ![]() The question of whether fish feel pain – or indeed anything at all – therefore stimulates sometimes polarized debate. However, nociceptors are merely necessary, not sufficient, for true pain, and many measures held to indicate sentience have the same problem. Integrative Biology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canadaĭebates around fishes' ability to feel pain concern sentience: do reactions to tissue damage indicate evaluative consciousness (conscious affect), or mere nociception? Thanks to Braithwaite's research leadership, and concerns that current practices could compromise welfare in countless fish, this issue's importance is beyond dispute.
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